This document discusses the Know-your-customer (KYC) processes supported by Taler.
To legally operate, Taler has to comply with KYC regulation that requires banks to identify parties involved in transactions at certain points.
The solution should support fees to be paid by the user for the KYC process (#7365).
Taler needs to run KYC checks in the following circumstances:
We introduce a new wire_targets table into the exchange database. This
table is referenced as the source or destination of payments (regular deposits
and also P2P payments). A positive side-effect is that we reduce duplication
in the reserves_in, wire_out and deposits tables as they can
reference this table.
We introduce a new legitimization_processes table that tracks the status
of a legitimization process at a provider, including the configuration section
name, the user/account name at the provider, and some legitimization
identifier for the process at the provider. In this table, we additionally
store information related to the KYC status of the underlying payto://-URI, in
particular when the KYC expires (0 if it was never done).
Finally, we introduce a new legitimization_requirements table that
contains a list of checks required for a particular wire target. When KYC is
triggered (say when some endpoint returns an HTTP status code of 451) a
new requirement is first put into the requirements table. Then, when the
client identifies as business or individual the specific legitimization
process is started. When the taler-exchange-aggregator triggers a KYC check
the merchant can observe this when a 202 (Accepted) status code is returned
on GET /deposits/ with the respective legitimization requirement row.
The new /kyc-check/ endpoint is based on the legitimization requirements
serial number and receives the business vs. individual status from the client.
Access is authenticated by also passing the hash of the payto://-URI.
(Weak authentication is acceptable, as the KYC status or the ability to
initiate a KYC process are not very sensitive.) Given this triplet, the
/kyc-check/ endpoint returns either the (positive) KYC status or redirects
the client (202) to the next required stage of the KYC process. The
redirection must be for an HTTP(S) endpoint to be triggered via a simple HTTP GET. As this endpoint is involved in every KYC check at the beginning, this is also the place where we can
integrate the payment process for the KYC fee.
The specific KYC provider to be executed depends on the configuration (see
below) which specifies a $PROVIDER_SECTION for each authentication procedure.
For each (enabled) provider, the exchange has a logic plugin which
(asynchronously) determines the redirect URL for a given wire target. See
below for a description of the high-level process for different providers.
Upon completion of the process at the KYC provider, the provider must trigger
a GET request to a new /kyc-proof/$H_PAYTO/$PROVIDER_SECTION endpoint.
This may be done either by redirecting the browser of the user to that
endpoint. Once this endpoint is triggered, the exchange will pass the
received arguments to the respective logic plugin. The logic plugin will then
(asynchronously) update the KYC status of the user. The logic plugin should
return a human-readable HTML page with the KYC result to the user.
Alternatively, the KYC confirmation may be triggered by a /kyc-webhook
request. As KYC providers do not necessarily support passing detailed
information in the URL arguments, the /kyc-webhook only needs to specify
either the PROVIDER_SECTION or the LOGIC (the name of the plugin
implementing the KYC API). The API-specific webhook logic must then figure
out what exactly the webhook is about on its own. The /kyc-webhook/
endpoint works for GET or POST, again as details depend on the KYC provider.
In contrast to kyc-proof, the response does NOT go to the end-users’
browser and should thus only indicate success or failure.
When withdrawing, the exchange checks if the KYC status is acceptable. If no
KYC was done and if either the amount withdrawn over a particular timeframe
exceeds the threshold or the reserve received received a P2P transfer, then a
451 Unavailable for Legal Reasons is returned which redirects the consumer
to the new /kyc-check/ handler.
When depositing, the exchange aggregator (!) checks the KYC status and if
negative, returns an additional information field via the
aggregation_transient table which is returned via GET /deposts/ to the
merchant. This way, the merchant learns the requirement_row needed to
begin the KYC process (this is independent of the amount) at the new
/kyc-check/ handler.
When merging into a reserve, the KYC status is checked and again the
merge fails with 451 Unavailable for Legal Reasons to trigger the
KYC process.
To allow the wallet to do the KYC check if it is about to exceed a set balance
threshold, we modify the /keys response to add an optional array
wallet_balance_limit_without_kyc of threshold amounts is returned.
Whenever the wallet crosses one of these thresholds for the first time, it
should trigger the KYC process. If this field is absent, there is no limit.
If the field is provided, a correct wallet must create a long-term
account-reserve key pair. This should be the same key that is also used to
receive wallet-to-wallet payments. Then, before a wallet performs an
operation that would cause it to exceed the balance threshold in terms of
funds held from a particular exchange, it should first request the user to
complete the KYC process.
For that, the wallet should POST to the new /wallet-kyc endpoint,
providing its long-term reserve-account public key and a signature requesting
permission to exceed the account limit. Here, the balance specified should
be the threshold (from the wallet_balance_limit_without_kyc array) that
the wallet would cross, and not the exact balance of the wallet. The
exchange will respond with a wire target UUID. The wallet can then use this
UUID to being the KYC process at /kyc-check/. The wallet must only proceed
to obtain funds exceeding the threshold after the KYC process has
concluded. While wallets could be “hacked” to bypass this measure (we cannot
cryptographically enforce this), such modifications are a terms of service
violation which may have legal consequences for the user.
The configuration specifies a set of providers, one per configuration section:
[kyc-provider-$PROVIDER_ID] # How expensive is it to use this provider? # Used to pick the cheapest provider possible. COST = NUMBER # Which plugin is responsible for this provider? LOGIC = PLUGIN_NAME # Which type of user does this provider handle? # Either INDIVIDUAL or BUSINESS. USER_TYPE = INDIVIDUAL # Which checks does this provider provide? # List of strings, no specific semantics. PROVIDED_CHECKS = SMS GOVID PHOTO # Plus additional logic-specific options, e.g.: AUTHORIZATION_TOKEN = superdupersecret FORM_ID = business_legi_form # How long is the check considered valid? EXPIRATION = DURATION
The configuration also specifies a set of legitimization requirements, one per configuration section:
[kyc-legitimization-$RULE_NAME] # Operation that triggers this legitimization. # Must be one of WITHDRAW, DEPOSIT, P2P-RECEIVE # or WALLET-BALANCE. OPERATION_TYPE = WITHDRAW # Required checks to be performed. # List of strings, must individually match the # strings in one or more provider’s PROVIDED_CHECKS. REQUIRED_CHECKS = SMS GOVID # Threshold amount above which the legitimization is # triggered. The total must be exceeded in the given # timeframe. Can be ‘forever’. THRESHOLD = AMOUNT # Timeframe over which the amount to be compared to # the THRESHOLD is calculated. # Ignored for WALLET-BALANCE. TIMEFRAME = DURATION
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS wire_targets
(wire_target_serial_id BIGSERIAL UNIQUE
,h_payto BYTEA NOT NULL CHECK (LENGTH(h_payto)=64),
,payto_uri STRING NOT NULL
,PRIMARY KEY (h_payto)
) SHARD BY (h_payto);
COMMENT ON TABLE wire_targets
IS 'All recipients of money via the exchange';
COMMENT ON COLUMN wire_targets.payto_uri
IS 'Can be a regular bank account, or also be a URI identifying a reserve-account (for P2P payments)';
COMMENT ON COLUMN wire_targets.h_payto
IS 'Unsalted hash of payto_uri';
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS legitimization_requirements
(legitimization_requirement_serial_id BIGINT GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY
,h_payto BYTEA NOT NULL CHECK (LENGTH(h_payto)=32)
,required_checks VARCHAR NOT NULL
,UNIQUE (h_payto, required_checks);
) PARTITION BY HASH (h_payto);
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS legitimization_processes
(legitimization_serial_id BIGSERIAL UNIQUE
,h_payto BYTEA NOT NULL CHECK (LENGTH(h_payto)=64)
,expiration_time INT8 NOT NULL DEFAULT (0)
,provider_section VARCHAR NOT NULL
,provider_user_id VARCHAR DEFAULT NULL
,provider_legitimization_id VARCHAR DEFAULT NULL
) PARTITION BY HASH (h_payto);
COMMENT ON COLUMN legitimizations.legitimization_serial_id
IS 'unique ID for this legitimization process at the exchange';
COMMENT ON COLUMN legitimizations.h_payto
IS 'foreign key linking the entry to the wire_targets table, NOT a primary key (multiple legitimizations are possible per wire target)';
COMMENT ON COLUMN legitimizations.expiration_time
IS 'in the future if the respective KYC check was passed successfully';
COMMENT ON COLUMN legitimizations.provider_section
IS 'Configuration file section with details about this provider';
COMMENT ON COLUMN legitimizations.provider_user_id
IS 'Identifier for the user at the provider that was used for the legitimization. NULL if provider is unaware.';
COMMENT ON COLUMN legitimizations.provider_legitimization_id
IS 'Identifier for the specific legitimization process at the provider. NULL if legitimization was not started.';
A new setting is required where the merchant backend can be configured for a business (default) or individual.
Note
This still needs to be done!
We introduce new kyc_status, kyc_timestamp and kyc_serial fields
into a new table with primary keys exchange_url and account. This
status is updated whenever a deposit is created or tracked, or whenever the
mechant backend receives a /kyc-check/ response from the exchange. Initially,
kyc_serial is zero, indicating that the merchant has not yet made any
deposits and thus does not have an account at the exchange.
A new private endpoint /kyc is introduced which allows frontends to
request the /kyc status of any configured account (including with long
polling). If the KYC status is negative or the kyc_timestamp not recent
(say older than one month), the merchant backend will re-check the KYC status
at the exchange (and update its cached status). The endpoint then returns
either that the KYC is OK, or information (same as from the exchange endpoint)
to begin the KYC process.
The merchant backend uses the new field to remember that a KYC is pending
(after /deposit, or tracing deposits) and the SPA then shows a
notification whenever the staff is logged in to the system. The notification
can be hidden for the current day (remembered in local storage).
The notification links to a (new) KYC status page. When opened, the KYC status
page first re-checks the KYC status with the exchange. If the KYC is still
unfinished, that page contains another link to begin the KYC process
(redirecting to the OAuth 2.0 login page of the legitimization resource
server), otherwise it shows that the KYC process is done. If the KYC is
unfinished, the SPA should use long-polling on the KYC status on this page to
ensure it is always up-to-date, and change to KYC satisfied should the
long-poller return with positive news.
..note:
Semi-related: The TMH_setup_wire_account() is changed to use 128-bit salt values (to keep ``deposits`` table small) and checks for salt to be well-formed should be added "everywhere".
An additional complication will arise once the exchange can trigger a KYC
fee (402) on /kyc-check/. In this case, the merchant SPA must show the QR
code to the merchant to allow the merchant to pay the KYC fee with a wallet.
The exchange primarily requires a KYC provider to be operated by the bank that offers an endpoint for with an API implemented by one of the logic plugins (and the respective legitimization configuration).
The $PROVIDER_SECTION is based on the name of the configuration section,
not on the name of the logic plugin (that we call $LOGIC). Using the
configuration section, the exchange then determines the logic plugin to use.
This section describes the general API for all of the supported KYC providers, as well as some details of how this general API could be implemented by the logic for different APIs.
This section provides a sketch of the proposed API for the KYC logic plugins.
kyc-check):kyc-proof):kyc-webhook):The plugins do not directly interact with the database, the caller sets the
expiration on success and also updates provider_user_id and
provider_legitimization_id in the tables as required.
For the webhook, we need a way to lookup h_payto by other data, so the
KYC logic plugin API should be provided a method lookup with:
- inputs: +
provider_section+provider_legitimization_id- outputs: +
h_payto+legitimization_process_row
In terms of configuration, the OAuth 2.0 logic requires the respective client credentials to be configured apriori to enable access to the legitimization service.
For the /kyc-check/ endpoint, the OAuth 2.0 logic may need to create and
store a nonce to be used during /kyc-proof/, depending on the OAuth
variant used. This may require another exchange table. The OAuth 2.0 process
must then be set up to end at the new /kyc-proof/$PROVIDER_ID/ endpoint.
This /kyc-proof/oauth2/ endpoint must query the OAuth 2.0 server using the
code argument provided as a query parameter. Based on the result, it then
updates the KYC table of the exchange with the legitimization status and
returns a human-readable KYC status page.
The /kyc-webhook/ is not applicable.
We would use the hosted flow. Endpoints return a request-id, which we should
log for diagnosis.
For /kyc-check/:
/api/v1/accounts using reference-id set to our h_payto.
Returns id (account_id)./verify endpoint using template-id (from configuration),
and account_id (from previous step) and a reference-id (use
the legitimization_serial_id for the new process). Set
redirect-uri to /kyc-proof/$PROVIDER_ID/. However, we cannot
rely on the user clicking this, so we must also configure a webhook.
The request returns a ‘verification-id. That we store under
the provider_legitimization_id in the database.For /kyc-proof/:
/api/v1/verifications endpoint to get the verification
status. Requires the verification-id from the previous step.
Results include: created/pending/completed/expired (aborted)/failed.For /kyc-webhook/:
verification-id to
lookup h_payto and return the result.For /kyc-check/:
/applicants with a type (person or company) to
obtain applicant_id. Store that under provider_user_id.
ISSUE: we need to get the company_name, business_activity_id
and registration_country before this somehow!/forms/$FORM_ID/urls
providing our h_payto as the external_applicant_id,
using the applicant_id from above,
and the /kyc-proof/$PROVIDER_ID for the redirect_url.form_url,
store the verification_id under provider_legitimization_id
in the database.For /kyc-proof/:
For /kyc-webhook/:
/verifications/{verification_id} to not trust an unsigned POST
to tell us anything for sure. The result is then returned.We could also store the access token (returned by OAuth 2.0), but that seems slightly more dangerous and given the close business relationship is unnecessary. Furthermore, not all APIs offer this.
We could extend the KYC logic API to return key attributes about the user (such as legal name, phone number, address, etc.) which we could then sign and return to the user. This would be useful in P2P payments to identify the origin of an invoice. However, we might want to be careful to not disclose the key attributes via the API by accident. This could likely be done by limiting access to the respective endpoint to messages with a signature by the reserve private key (which is the only case where we care to certify things anyway).
(This should be filled in with results from discussions on mailing lists / personal communication.)